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The dynamics of market prices is described as the evolution of opinions in the trading community
regarding future market behavior. The price then is a function of the voting process of the market
players in favor to raise or reduce the value of a stock. The model presented in this paper is suited
for pricing of options and was verified against real market data. The model allows deriving the
parameters of market players from available real market data, especially maximum possible correla-
tion (herding) and anti-correlation between the players’ opinions. The deviations of market prices
from those predicted by the Black-Scholes model, such as smile and skew implied volatilities, are
interpreted as the current values and limits of social influence of the market players, respectively. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that discriminates skew and smile phenomena. Our
approach unifies and develops a further connection between trading, voters model, and statistical
physics analogies of opinion dynamics.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
The world of finance provides a challenge to the mod-
eling of stock price dynamics as a function of the most
important market characteristics. The prices of financial
markets depend on the state of the economy, recent news,
stock trading regulations, and especially the mood of the
market players. To describe stock price dynamics, one
should develop a united analytic framework for behavior
of market players and for market mechanisms that trans-
late this behavior into actual prices of a stock and its
options (i.e., future contracts with a profit that depends
on the specific behavior of the stock price in the future).
Consequently, the modeling of stock markets is part of
a more general problem of community opinion dynamics
[1][2].
The current prices of options are affected by demand
and supply of the market players according to their be-
liefs regarding the future evolution of the prices. The fu-
ture distribution of prices imagined by the market players
might be revealed by the prices of the options[3][4]. For
instance, the greater expected change of the price of a
stock, the greater the change in the price of the corre-
sponding options that benefit from the raising market.
Financial markets supply a huge amount of historical
prices of stocks and their options to analyze, including
phenomena such as nationwide financial crises.
An analysis of historical market prices clearly demon-
strates abrupt changes that result in greater probabil-
ities than in Gaussian (normal) distributions for large
price steps. The Gaussian distribution is used as a ref-
∗Electronic address: alexfeigel@gmail.com
erence because it is a cumulative result of many random
independent contributions and it is widespread. Devi-
ations from the normal distribution are known as fat-
tail distribution[5]. Moreover, the distribution of future
prices imagined by the market players according to the
options prices possesses the same fat-tail distribution.
Non-Gaussian behavior of option prices is called volatil-
ity smile or skew[6]. It is notable that the volatility smile
developed significantly after the financial crisis of 1987[7].
The abrupt changes of the prices indicate com-
plex phenomena among the market players such as
communication[8], herding[9][10], or crashophobia[7].
These phenomena result in a collective response of the
market players that might explain abrupt (non-Gaussian)
changes of the prices[11][12][13]. Their connection to
markets makes these phenomena of great practical im-
portance.
Stock players are historically separated into bulls and
bears that act in favor of growing or reducing the market,
respectively. This analogy unites the problem of the mar-
ket players with the models of opinion dynamics[14][10].
Collective behavior such as herding emerges due to the
social influence between the players[9][15][16][8][17].
To test different models of voting or opinion dynamics
against real data of the market prices, one should link the
price of a stock with the amount of bulls and bears in the
market players community. Previous attempts assumed
a mere linear dependence of the price or change of the
price on disbalance between the bulls and the bears in
the community[14][10][18][19]. These assumptions gener-
ate prices with a fat-tail distribution in the case of herd-
ing of the market players. A comparison with real data
and an explanation of the real phenomenon of volatility
smile, however, require further clarification of the correct
dependence between the stock price and the parameters
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2of the market players, such as herding and social influ-
ence.
This Article presents a general description of stock and
options price formation as an opinion dynamics of the
market players to be either bulls or bears. The model
shows a good fit to real data of option prices, both of
stocks and indices. According to our results, the non-
Gaussian distribution of prices depends on social influ-
ence between the market players and the initial collective
memory on distribution of bears and bulls. Moreover, so-
cial influence and collective memory discriminate two dif-
ferent patterns, skew and smile, of the option prices. The
model describes both Gaussian and non-Gaussian distri-
butions, allowing a discussion of how the latter might
appear as it happened during the 1987 financial crisis.
We argue that a vote to price connection may be inde-
pendent of exact market mechanisms.
We demonstrate market modeling using the seminal
Black-Scholes model for pricing options[3][4]. This model
relies on two major assumptions. The first is that the
relative change in the price of a stock dS/S in a time step
dt is the sum of the deterministic change in monetary
value and a Gaussian stochastic process that describes
contribution of the market players:
dS
S
= µdt+ σdz, (1)
where µ is a prime rate, dz = φ(0, 1)
√
(dt) is a Wigner
process (φ(0, 1) is a random variable of normal distribu-
tion with mean 0 and standard deviation 1). The param-
eter σ is called volatility.
The volatility σ of the Black-Scholes model solely de-
scribes the result of the decision making and trades of the
market players. The stochastic process (1) corresponds
to diffusion in logS space d logS = (µ − 12σ2)dt + σdz
and, therefore, leads to a log normal distribution of the
prices:
PBS =
1√
2piσ2
exp
(logS − µ+ 12σ2t)2
2σ2t
. (2)
High values of volatility σ, therefore, correspond to
greater changes of the stock prices at a given period of
time.
The second assumption of the Black-Scholes model is
the non-arbitrage principle, also called an assumption of
the effective market, which allows one to link the dynam-
ics of the stock prices with the price of future contracts,
for instance put or call options. Consider a plain vanilla
call option, which is the right to buy a stock S at some
strike price K after some maturity time M . The value of
a call option C with strike price K as a function of the
corresponding stock price S at the maturity day is:
C(S,K) = max (0, S −K) . (3)
This expression describes the possibility to buy stock at
price K and immediately sell it at price S. The value of
the option is its average return multiplied by the expected
change in monetary value until the maturity time:
CBS(µ, σ,K, tM ) =
∫ ∞
0
PBS(S, tM )C(S,K)dS, (4)
where P (S, t) is the expected distribution of stock value
at maturity time tM . The distribution of stock value is
unequivocally linked to the dynamics of the stock price.
Any deviation from (4) leads to arbitrage possibilities
between investments in stock and its options.
The Black-Scholes model describes the future distri-
bution of stock prices PBS together with corresponding
prices of the options CBS as the functions of the sin-
gle free parameter, volatility σ, see eq. (4). One might,
therefore, calibrate volatility against current prices of op-
tions using eq. (4). This calibration is essential to use P
for pricing exotic or non-tradable options and to get un-
observable parameters such as ∂C∂S for hedging. However,
the calibration of the Black-Scholes model demonstrates
that single parameter volatility σ does not suffice to de-
scribe the dynamics of the observed market prices.
The real prices of options are presented by the implied
volatility surface σimp(K, tM ), which describes the de-
viation of the reality from the Black-Scholes model[20].
Implied volatility is defined for each strike price K and
maturity time tM as the volatility of the Black-Scholes
model that corresponds to the current price of option
Cobs(K, tM ):
CBS(µ, σimp(K, tM ),K, tM ) = Cobs(K, tM ), (5)
where the Black-Scholes value of options is defined by eq.
(4). The volatility surface is flat in case of a Black-Scholes
market since eq. (4 has the same solution σimp(K, tM ) =
σ for all values of K and tM . In reality, the volatility
surface is far from being flat, indicating a non-Gaussian
behavior of the stock price.
After the financial crisis of 1987, implied volatility as
a function of strike price K for a given maturity time tM
generally demonstrates smile or skew behavior (see Fig.
1). This deviation from flat Black-Scholes volatility indi-
cates that stock price dynamics is not Gaussian. Skew is
more present in indices that are averages of many stocks,
and smile is more common for stocks.
To describe the volatility smile phenomenon, one
should correct the stochastic process (1) to include
non-Gaussian dynamics. The main corrections in-
clude stochastic[21], local volatility[22][6], and additional
stochastic processes such as jumps or non-Gaussian be-
havior due to correlated behavior of the players (opin-
ion aggregation)[20]. The stochastic volatility approach
assumes volatility σ to be a stochastic process. Local
volatility is the assumption that σ(S, tM ) is a function
of stock price and maturity time. These two corrections
possess high practical value. However, they lack reason-
able justification and cannot explain the nature of the
volatility smile phenomenon. Human parameters such
as crashofobia or herding are difficult to quantify and to
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FIG. 1: Implied volatility surfaces of skew and smile types. Implied volatility of a given option is a function of the
options strike price and maturity time. The implied volatility is presented at four maturity times (1,3,6, and 12 months) as a
function of strike to spot prices ratio, where spot is the price of the corresponding stock or index at the time of the graph. (A)
Implied volatility surface of SPX index at 12/26/01 with clear skew pattern. (B) Vodafone Company (VOD) stock from and
12/27/01. It presents a more smile behavior than skew, except late maturity times. The model of this work (solid markers)
successfully fits the implied volatilities of both smile and skew types.
compare with real data. That leads to arguments re-
garding the true nature of the volatility smile and the
corresponding dynamic of market players.
Market micromodeling using agent simulations is an
alternative approach for deriving the stochastic process
of a stock[23][24][25][18][26]. A market player is modeled
to the level of its strategy to buy and sell available assets.
Market mechanisms then translate the actions of many
players into changes of the prices. An advantage of this
approach is a clear understanding of all processes on all
levels. A disadvantage is the great number of parameters
and the difficulty to define completely human trading as
the actions of an agent in simulation.
This work presents price dynamics as a function of
the limited number of parameters with special empha-
sis on social influence (herding) between the market
players[14][10]. We present an alternative way to network
topology to define social responsivity that is better inte-
grated in classic modeling of market prices by stochastic
processes[3]. The advantages of our method include both
positive and negative social influence, boundaries, and
dynamics. We achieve a good fit of the model with real
market data and answer some-long standing questions,
such as the origin and especially the difference between
smile and skew in implied volatility surfaces.
When social influence is zero, our model converges to
the Black-Scholes model result. This is due to the as-
sumption that players without mutual effect compose a
Gaussian Black-Scholes market.
The model is suitable for parallel Monte Carlo simu-
lations. A Graphical Processing Unit (GPU) was used
to calibrate the model’s parameters to fit real data. The
model may be optimized further for practical needs.
Next, we describe the model in detail, present the re-
sults of fitting real volatility surfaces, and discuss the ba-
sic assumptions, implications, and relations of our model
to other works.
II. THE MODEL
We model a market assuming the following general
characteristics (see Fig 2). The market players collect
available information and define their strategies to profit
either from increasing or decreasing prices; the players
that expect neutral market are neglected at this point.
The players, according their choice, are called either bulls
or bears. To decide their strategy, the players might
observe historic and current prices of stocks together
with the corresponding options. The market mechanisms
translate the players decisions into real prices. The op-
tion prices depend on the non-observable distribution of
future prices of the corresponding stock through non-
arbitrage principle (4).
There are two steps to defining the stochastic dynam-
ics of the stocks as a function of the parameters of the
market players. First, we describe trading as a voting
process with two choices to be either bear or bull. Sec-
ond, we derive the price change of a stock as a function of
4FIG. 2: Stock market observable and hidden param-
eters. The observable parameters of a market include his-
torical and current prices of stocks, indices, and their op-
tions. The price of a stock S is affected by noisy reality, its
interpretation by the market players, and the market trad-
ing mechanisms that transform players actions into the price
change ∆S. The stochastic nature of the reality and mar-
ket players results in a probability distribution P (S, T ) of the
future stock price to possess a specific value S in a succeed-
ing time T . This distribution follows unequivocally from the
prices of stock options C (e.g., price of a permit to buy the
stock in the future at a predetermined strike price) assuming
an arbitrage-free efficient market. This distribution P (S, T )
is unobservable directly, though it is connected unequivocally
with the prices of options through the non-arbitrage principle.
A reliable market model has to predict the prices distribution
P (S, T ) that corresponds to the observable values of current
and historical option prices.
the outcome of the voting process. We argue that under
general circumstances this function is unique, disregard-
ing the exact market mechanisms.
We can then derive option prices as a function of the
parameters of the market players community. The distri-
bution of the future stock prices is obtained by averaging
stochastic stock price dynamics. It allows calculating the
corresponding options prices and calibrating the model
parameters against real market data.
A. Market of non-interacting players and
Black-Scholes (Gaussian) prices
According to this model, the market players are sepa-
rated into bulls that push the prices up and bears that
try to move the market down. The ratio between bulls
FIG. 3: Stock price dynamics as a voting process by
the market players. The market players are generally sep-
arated into bulls and bears. Bulls play long: they buy and
sell stocks, indices, and their option to make profit from the
raising market. Bears, on the other hand, play short: they
try to profit from decreasing prices. The number of bulls and
bears among the market players changes with time. It resem-
bles a voting process where at each time a player has to decide
either to be a bull (vote up in favor of a raising market) or
to be a bear (vote down against a raising market). In this
article, we hypothesize that this process defines the dynamics
of stock prices. The market then is presented as a function
F (∆γ), where ∆γ is the change in ratio between bulls and
total number of the market players.
and all market players γ is:
γ =
Nbull
Nbull +Nbear
=
Nbull
N
, (6)
where Nbull and Nbear are the total numbers of bulls and
bears, respectively, and N is the total number of players.
The ratio γ changes with time since the players change
their state occasionally (see Fig. 3). The trade advances
by discrete steps in time.
To derive the stochastic process for the ratio of bulls to
the total number of market players γ during a single trad-
ing step, we make two assumptions. First, the number
of transactions is proportional to the number of possible
interactions between bulls and bears γ(1 − γ). Thus, γ
changes either by a positive or by a negative step:
∆γ± ∝ ±γ(1− γ). (7)
Second, in the absence of communication, the probability
of a player to change its state (from bear to bull or vice
versa) is assumed equal for all players. Consequently, the
probabilities of positive and negative steps are:
P+ = 1− γ, (8)
P− = γ,
, respectively, because γ is the ratio of bulls in the com-
munity (6).
5Following (7) and (8), the stochastic dynamics of bull
ratio as a generalized Wigner process:
dγ = µ (γ, t) dt+ σ (γ, t) dzγ , (9)
taking into account that σ ∝ √(∆γ+)2P+ + (∆γ−)2P−
and µ ∝ ∆γ+P+ + ∆γ−P−, is:
dγ = −(γ − γ?)γ(1− γ)σ2γdt+ σγγ(1− γ)dzγ , (10)
where σγ is an arbitrary constant and γ
? = 1/2. The
main properties of (10) are the limited range of 0 < γ < 1
and zero drift µ(γ, t) = 0 term in the case of neutral pop-
ulation γ = 1/2. The latter is a direct consequence of the
second assumption, i.e., an unbiased population (equal
probability for all players). In general, biased population
equilibrium occurs at different values 0 < γ? < 1, be-
cause the step probabilities become P ?+ = 0.5 + γ
? − γ
and P ?− = 0.5− γ? + γ.
Having a stochastic process for γ (10), we are now
searching for a market function F (γ) that translates the
voting process into stock price dynamics of the Black-
Scholes type:
dF (γ) =
dS
S
= µSdt+ σSdzS . (11)
To find this function, we use Itos lemma, describing the
differential of a time-dependent function of a stochastic
process (9):
dF (γ, t) =
(
∂F
∂γ
µ+
∂F
∂t
+
1
2
∂2F
∂γ2
σ2
)
dt+σ
∂F
∂γ
dz. (12)
The requirement (11) means that coefficients of both
terms in (12) are constant, similar to Eq. (11).
Following (11) and (12), the market function F (γ)
that translates the voting process (10) into Black-Scholes
stock price dynamics is:
F (γ) = B log
γ
1− γ . (13)
where B is a numeric coefficient. Substituting (13) in
(12), we get:
dF (γ) = Bσ2γ
(
γ? − 1
2
)
dt+BσγdzF , (14)
The change in the price of a stock as a function of γ is:
dS
S
= B∆ log
(
γ
1− γ
)
, (15)
Integration of (15) gives:
S =
(
γ
1− γ
)B
. (16)
It follows from analogy between (14) and (11) if:
µS ∝ Bσ2γ
(
γ? − 1
2
)
, (17)
σS ∝ Bσγ .
and assuming that:
dzγ = dzS , (18)
the noise of a stock is the noise of the voting process and
the market is deterministic in the sense that it does not
contribute with additional noise.
The stochastic process for the ratio of bulls to the total
number of the market players (Eq. 10) should be modified
to include the deviation of stock price dynamics from the
Gaussian process (eq. 11). We argue that the expression
Eq. 15 holds for any modification of Eq. 10. It is true if
the market is described by a function of the vote outcome
γ and is independent of how it was obtained.
B. Market players with social influence
To extend the model to include stock price dynamics
that is different from the Black-Scholes model (11), we in-
troduce the social influence between the market players.
Social influence means that the state of a player depends
on the state of the other players rather than being bull
or bear with probabilities γ and 1−γ independent of the
environment.
We describe the interaction between market player i
and any other randomly selected player j as follows: The
probability per contact of player i to be bear (P ijbear) de-
pends on the state of player j. This conditional proba-
bility is given by:
P ijbear =
{
αij if sj = 1
βij if sj = 0
= αijsj + βij(1− sj), (19)
where sj is the state of player j (sj = 1 for bull state
and sj = 0 for bear state) and parameter αij and βij is
the probability per contact of player i being bear given
player j is bear or bull correspondingly, regardless of the
state of player i prior to the interaction with player j.
In the mean field approximation, players exposed
equally to the state of all other players (αij , βij) ≡ (α, β),
Eq. 19 become
Pbear ≡ P ibear =
1
N
N∑
j=1
[αsj + β(1− sj)]. (20)
Using the definition for γ = Pbull = 1− Pbear, we get
Pbear = 1− γ = γα+ (1− γ)β. (21)
Therefore, we can derive an expression for γ in terms of
the conditional probabilities α and β
γ =
1− β
1 + α− β , (22)
because in steady state the ratio of bull players to the
total number of the players equals to the probability of
players to be bull (see Fig. 4).
6To calculate social influence[27], let us estimate the
response of the homogeneous community (α, β) to the
injection of a group of relative size ρ and unconditional
average state γρ. An unconditional response is indepen-
dent of other players. The mean field eq. (21) in this
case becomes:
1− γ = (1− ρ)(γα+ (1− γ)β) + (23)
+ρ(γρα+ (1− γρ)β),
because a player possesses probabilities 1 − ρ and ρ to
interact with a responsive and an unconditional player,
respectively. Eq. (23) can be rewritten as:
γ = γ(1− α) + (1− γ)(1− β) + ρ∆γ(β − α), (24)
where ∆γ = γρ − γ and, therefore, ρ∆γ indicates the
strength of the injection.
The responsivity of average ratio of bulls to the to-
tal number of market players γ to the injection of the
unconditional group of strength ρ∆γ, following (24), is:
χs =
∂γ
∂(ρ∆γ)
=
β − α
1− (β − α) , (25)
For small perturbations ρ∆γ one gets:
γfinal = γinitial + χsρ(γρ − γinitial), (26)
where γinitial and γfinal are the average ratios of bulls
prior and after the perturbation occurs. Social respon-
sivity vanishes χs = 0 if α = β because in this case the
players possess probabilities γ to be bear independent of
the state of the other players. Responsivity diverges at
(α = 0, β = 1). At this point, a single individuals change
of state causes a phase-like transition of the state of the
entire community.
Social responsivity χs (25) depends on the single herd-
ing parameter:
I = β − α, (27)
with range −1 < I < 1. It might be called herding be-
cause the contribution of ρ∆γ unconditional group to γ
of responsive players is proportional to I; see (24). Thus,
it indicates how much the responsive players are affected
by a single member of the injected unconditional group.
For comparison, the herding parameter is defined in [10]
using community graph topology as a ratio c of the com-
munity that are connected to a single member and form
a cluster of correlated behavior. The main advantage of
I is that it describes both positive and negative social
influence.
The absolute value of the herding parameter |I| might
be limited in real communities because high social re-
sponsivity assumes a high level of direct or indirect in-
formation exchange in community. A high level of infor-
mation flow is limited because of the stochastic nature of
market news, the topology of communication channels,
and the tendency to hide individual strategies.
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FIG. 4: Population of market players: the average
state. The average amount of bulls γ in a population com-
posed only of the players (α, β) is obtained using mean field
methods. The same values of γ may correspond to differ-
ent probabilities of player market correlations. These are de-
fined by (α, β). For instance, γ = 0.5 for both correlated
(α = 1, β = 0) and anti-correlated (α = 0, β = 1) states, see
eq. (29). The sensitivity of γ is greater near the correlated
state (α = 0, β = 1). The dashed line indicates the I = 0.6
herding parameter.
The mutual information of the players can be a mea-
sure of information exchange in the trading community.
Mutual information between market players A and B
is the amount of known information about state of B
if state of A is known for certain. Greater mutual in-
formation indicates either direct or indirect information
flow. The direct information flow assumes communica-
tion, while the indirect information flow assumes syn-
chronization by common external signal. Mutual infor-
mation makes possible to separate markets with com-
pletely random and highly correlated choices of the play-
ers, corresponding to the lack of social influences and
developed social influences, respectively.
Mutual information in a community of homogeneous
players (α, β), see Fig. 5, is defined by probabilities
ΩBull,Bull, ΩBull,Bear, ΩBear,Bull and ΩBear,Bear for four
possible interactions in the community:
E =
∑
p,q=Bull,Bear
Ωp,q ×
× log2
(
Ωp,q
(Ωp,Bull + Ωp,Bear)(ΩBull,q + ΩBear,q)
)
.
(28)
These probabilities are:
ΩBull,Bull = (1− α)γ, ΩBear,Bear = β(1− γ)
ΩBear,Bull = αγ, ΩBull,Bear = (1− β)(1− γ), (29)
following the definition of conditional probabilities α and
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FIG. 5: Mutual information and herding of identical
market players (α, β). The value of this mutual informa-
tion describes the amount of information that is known about
the state of the market provided by a state of the player and
vice versa. Mutual information is maximum = 1bit for pop-
ulations that correlated (α = 0, β = 1) or anti-correlated
(α = 0, β = 1) with the markets. In the case of random
α = beta or constant responses α = 0 or β = 1, the mutual
information is = 0bit. The finite value of mutual information,
therefore, is impossible without either direct or indirect ex-
change of information between the players. The dashed line
indicates I = 0.6 herding parameter.
β. Substituting (29) in (28) we get:
E(α, β) =
= log2
(
(1− α)(1−α)γ(1− β)(1−β)(1−γ)ααγββ(1−γ)
γγ(1− γ)1−γ
)
,
(30)
where γ is defined by (22)[17].
The relationship between herding parameter I, ratio of
bulls γ (22), and mutual information E (30) is presented
in Figs. 4 and 5. Communities with the same herding I
might possesses arbitrary values of γ. The specific value
of herding, however, constraints the possible maximum
value of mutual information in the community and, vice
versa, the specific value of mutual information limits the
possible herding. For instance, the mutual information
in community γ = 0.5 is:
E = log2
[
(1 + I)
1+I
2 (1− I) 1−I2
]
, (31)
These constraints are valid for social influence (25), mak-
ing impossible to achieve the maximum value at I = 1
(α = 0, β = 1 point).
C. General Market Model
The community of the market players is considered as
a point in the space of conditional probabilities (α, β),
see Fig. 6. The dynamics is limited to a subspace that is
bounded by two mutual influence limits, namely Ilow <
I < Iup. On the mutual influence boundaries, we have
reflecting boundary conditions.
If Ilow, Iup ≈ 0 then α ≈ β, there is no mutual influence
and the players state is independent of other players. In
this case, the model converges to the Black-Scholes result,
since the dynamics is described by asymmetric random
walk (Eq. 10) and the stocks price exhibit a log-normal
behavior (definition of F (γ)).
In the general case Ilow, Iup 6= 1, the community prop-
agates by the stochastic process:
dα = −(α− α?)α(1− α)σ2αdt+ σαα(1− α)dzα,(32)
dβ = −(β − β?)β(1− β)σ2βdt+ σββ(1− β)dzβ ,
starting from some initial point (α0, β0). It is derived
assuming that, if the market is fixed to either bullish or
bearish state, the ratio of bears (α and β, respectively)
behaves analogous with γ (Eq. 10). Moreover, in the case
of random responses α = β, the process (Eq. 33) should
exactly converge to (Eq. 10) taking into account (Eq. 22).
The parameters α? and β? in (33) indicate equilibrium
values of α and β in case noise term vanishes. The choice
of (α?, β?) is ambiguous. In this work, we assume that
this point corresponds to neutral population γ = 0.5 and
possesses the same herding coefficient I as the current
state (α, β) of the trading community:
β? =
1
2
+
1
2
(β − α), (33)
α? =
1
2
− 1
2
(β − α),
The sensitivity to specific values of (α?, β?) on our results
is low; it was checked by assuming α? = β? = 1/2.
The stock price S is updated at each time step of the
process. The initial value is set to S = 1. The simula-
tion proceeds by steps in time of arbitrary small value
∆t. At each step, the next coordinates (αnext, βnext) are
calculated:
∆αµ = −(α− α?)α(1− α) ∗∆t ∗ σ2α, (34)
∆ασ = α(1− α) ∗∆t0.5 ∗ σα ∗ φ(0, 1),
αnext = α+ ∆αµ + ∆ασ.
∆βµ = −(β − β?)β(1− β) ∗∆t ∗ σ2β , (35)
∆βσ = β(1− β) ∗∆t0.5 ∗ σβ ∗ φ(0, 1),
βnext = β + ∆βµ + ∆βσ.
8where α? and β? are defined by (33). New coordinates
(αnext, βnext) lead to a new value of γnext:
γnext =
1− βnext
1− βnext + αnext , (36)
following Eq. 22. The new stock price is calculated using
Eq. (15):
Snext = S + S ∗
[
log
γnext
1− γnext − log
γ
1− γ
]
∗Bpar,(37)
Then, call option prices are calculated for different strike
prices K
C(t,K) = max(S(t)−K), (38)
where C(t,K) is an average over different runs for a set
of times and strike prices.
Finally, implied volatility is calculated solving Eq. 5
by iterations. The prime value µ is used only while cal-
culating implied volatility. The prime is neglected in the
voting process itself. This volatility value is reduced by
constant ∆market
σimp = σplayers −∆market. (39)
This new parameter ∆market essential to fit the real val-
ues of volatility. It can be interpreted as a reduction of
volatility by market regulations.
The models parameters are summarized as follows:
• σα - volatility-like parameters for market players
vote in conditional probability to be bear in a
bullish market.
• kasym, σβ = σα ∗ kasym - volatility-like parameters
for market players vote in conditional probability
to be bear in a bearish market.
• Ilow - lower boundary of propagation in (α, β) space
and β − α > Ilow
• Iup - upper boundary of propagation in (α, β) space
β − α < Iup
• µ - prime is known though it can be treated as a
free parameter
• ∆market - lowering of implied volatility of the mar-
ket players by market regulations. This parameter
is not fitted but calculated at each run.
• α0 - initial α coordinate of the population
• β0 - initial β coordinate of the population
• B - coefficient between votes and stock prices
change
These parameters define the simulation and corre-
sponding implied volatility surface σimp(T,K). The im-
plied volatility surface for specific parameters values is
derived via a Monte Carlo simulation enforced by GPU
processing[28]. The resulting volatility surface is com-
pared with the actual surface and multiple runs are made
to adjust the parameters using a simplex optimization
method[29] fro GNU Scientific Library[30].
III. RESULTS
The results include sets of the model parameters to-
gether with the corresponding calculated volatility sur-
faces that provide the best match of the real implied
volatility surfaces either of skew or smile types. Cali-
brating the models parameters against real market data
accomplishes two main tasks. First, it demonstrates the
models ability to describe a wide range of the real volatil-
ity surfaces for practical trading or hedging. Second, it
identifies the main parameters of the model responsible
for skew or smile volatility for better understanding of
these phenomena.
Calibration is done either by using a single set of pa-
rameters’ values for the entire implied volatility surface or
by using different parameters’ values for implied volatil-
ities with different maturity times. The latter is done
because we cannot fit all surface by a single set of param-
eters. Consequently, the parameters may be functions of
maturity time, similar to the definition of implied volatil-
ity.
The models parameters were calibrated against real
implied volatility surfaces corresponding to the S & P
index (SPX) at different times and Vodafone Company
(VOD) stock:
• SPX index at 12/26/01 with maturities of 1,3,6,
and 12 months
• VOD stock at 12/27/01 with maturities of 1,3,6,
and 12 months
• SPX index at 09/15/05 with maturities of 1 day
together with 1,3,6,15 months
These cases include implied volatilities with both smile
and skew at different strengths.
The index is an average of many stocks; therefore, it
represents well the average properties of the market. On
the contrary, a single stock such as VOD can deviate from
average market behavior and from general assumptions
of the model.
The skew pattern of SPX was successfully fitted by
a single set of parameters that are independent of time
and price value. On the contrary, the smile pattern of
VOD and early SPX cannot be fitted be a single set of
parameters; therefore, it was fitted separately for each
maturity time.
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FIG. 6: The dynamics of the market players in conditional probabilities space and corresponding dynamics
of stock price The dynamics of market players population in (α, β) space defines the dynamics of the corresponding stock
price S. The population is described by a single point (α, β). The dynamics of the population is the diffusion with a drift
under topological constraints. (A) Topological constraints are defined by imposing limits on herding I in the community
β = α + Iup,low. (B) The limit of the Black-Scholes model occurs in the case of Iup, Ilow ≈ 0, which limits the population to
random behavior α ≈ β. (C) The population starts at the initial position (α0, β0). Each step of the population is transferred
to ∆γ and then to ∆S using eq. (15). (D) The population is subjected to diffusion, which is asymmetric along α and β axis.
We assume the drift if σα = σbeta = 0 population converges to γ = 0.5 while preserving its value of herding I.
A. SPX 12/26/01
The implied volatility surface of the SPX index from
12/26/01 demonstrates clear skew behavior at maturity
times 1,3,6, and 12 months. First, we fit the surface
with the entire set of model’s parameters (see Fig. 7 and
Table III A). The results include both mean and standard
deviation values obtained over many calibration runs.
Small standard deviations (see Table III A) of the cal-
ibrated herding limits, volatilities σα = σ and σβ =
kasymσ, initial position of the community (α0, β0), and
market volatility correction ∆market indicate the impor-
tant role of these parameters. The real value of prime
µ = 4.5% at 12/26/01 is within the error range of the re-
sult. Interestingly, the initial position of the population
is almost neutral α0 ≈ βo ≈ 0.5 and coefficient B ≈ 1.
To highlight the most important parameters and to re-
duce the calibration time, some parameters where fixed
with predefined values. Based on the previous results
using the complete set of optimized parameters, the ini-
tial position is chosen to be (α0 = 0.5, β0 = 0.5) and
B = 1. The value of prime µ = 0.045 corresponds to its
10
Parameter Optimized value
Iup 0.24 ± 0.009
Ilow -0.03 ± 0.006
σ 1.37 ± 0.04
kasym 0.74 ± 0.016
µ 0.069 ± 0.026
α0 0.50 ± 0.004
β0 0.51 ± 0.005
B 1.09 ± 0.03
∆market 0.99 ± 0.04
TABLE I: Parameters of the model (mean value ± stan-
dard deviation) that fit implied volatility surface of S &
P index from 12/26/01. All models parameters were cali-
brated, including the known prime that was 4.5% at that
time (12/26/01). Parameters were calibrated multiple times
starting from different initial values. Error bars, therefore,
also indicate the accuracy of the parameters. For instance, a
high accuracy of the herding limits is essential to obtaining
this result. The most surprising and interesting findings are:
First, the allowed space of herding I is shifted toward pos-
itive social influence. Second, the real value of prime 0.045
from 12/26/01 lies within the error range of the calculated
value, though the model possesses no previous knowledge of
its value. Third, B is ≈ 1. Fourth, the initial position of the
population is (α ≈ 0.5, β ≈ 0.5). The latter, in the framework
of the model, can be interpreted as neutral market condition
where both increase and decrease of the prices is possible with
equal probability.
real value at that time (12/26/01). This reduction barely
affects the quality of the fit (see Fig. 8 and Table II).
Parameter Optimized value
Iup 0.23 ± 0.03
Ilow -0.05 ± 0.03
σ 1.38 ± 0.13
kasym 0.74 ± 0.07
∆market 0.88 ± 0.05
TABLE II: Calibration of the model against implied volatil-
ity surface of S & P index from 12/26/01 with a reduced set
of parameters to simplify the model and reduce the calibra-
tion time. This set is chosen based on the results using the
optimized complete set of parameters. The other parameters
are assumed prime 0.045, B = 1, (α, β) = (0.5, 0.5).
The derived herding limits indicate that the decisions
of the market players to be either bull or bear tend to
correlate with market behavior. The allowed space for
diffusion is shifted toward region (β > α) that includes
state of the maximum correlation (α = 0, β = 1) (see
Figs. 9 and 6). On the other hand, there is no possi-
bility of exact correlations with the market due to social
influence limits.
B. VOD 12/27/01
The implied volatility of the Vodafone Company
(VOD) demonstrates clear smile behavior at maturity
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FIG. 7: Fit of the complete model to the implied
volatility surface of SPX index from 12/26/01. Calcu-
lated implied volatility surface following the optimized com-
plete set of model parameters (see Table III A) together with
the real one. The error bars correspond to the accuracy of
the parameters after multiple attempts of optimization.
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FIG. 8: The fit of the reduced model to the implied
volatility surfaces of SPX index from 12/26/01. The
same as Figure 7. The optimization was performed on the
subset of the model parameters (see Table II). The other pa-
rameters B = 1, (α, β) = 0.5 following the complete opti-
mization and supporting discussion. Prime was chosen as its
value at that time. The accuracy is only slightly worse than
in the case of the complete set of parameters.
times of 1,3, and 6 months. The smile effect, however, re-
duces with greater maturity time. The implied volatility
with maturity 1 year is of the skew type. As in the SPX
case, the results are obtained over many calibration runs
and include both the mean and the standard deviation
value for optimized parameters.
We found it impossible to fit the entire implied volatil-
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FIG. 9: Herding limits obtained for SPX index from
12/25/01. The dynamics of the market players starts at the
point (α0 = 0.5, β0 = 0.5) and remains confined to the bright
region; compare with Fig. 6. The limits impose boundaries
on maximum positive (correlation with the market) and max-
imum negative (anti-correlation with the market) social influ-
ence.
ity surface of VOD with a single set of model parame-
ters. Each maturity time then was fitted separately (see
Table III). For maturity times of 6 and 12 months, addi-
tional solutions were found (see Table IV). Convergence
depends on the initial choice of parameters.
The fit of strong smile pattern of single maturity time
depends more on the initial position of the population,
while moderate smiles and skew can be fitted both by
initial condition and by herding limits (see Fig. 10). The
initial position may indicate a starting value of herding
of the market players together with an excess of demand
(disbalance between bears and bulls in the players com-
munity).
Parameter 1 Month 3 Month 6 Month 1 Year
σ 1.74 ± 0.2 1.90 ± 0.25 1.31 ± 0.04 1.01 ± 0.06
kasym 0.64 ± 0.25 0.83 ± 0.084 0.85 ± 0.03 0.91 ± 0.01
α0 0.79 ± 0.08 0.74 ± 0.06 0.74 ± 0.02 0.72 ± 0.01
β0 0.35 ± 0.13 0.38 ± 0.06 0.43 ± 0.01 0.62 ± 0.03
B 1.00 ± 0.26 1.06 ± 0.26 1.05 ± 0.08 1.13 ± 0.20
∆market 0.17 ± 0.22 0.44 ± 0.1 0.21 ± 0.06 0.29 ± 0.10
TABLE III: Parameters of the model (mean value ± standard deviation) that fit the implied volatility surface of VOD stock
from 12/27/01. The fit was done without herding limits and with prime = 0.045 at that time. No limits of herding were set
due to the impossibility to fit the initial high smile with any herding limit. As in the case of SPX B ≈ 1. The initial position,
however, is drastically different from 0.5. The initial position, in the models framework, can be interpreted as a market in
inertia either to increase or to decrease.
There are multiple fit solutions for maturity times 6
and 12 months. A mild smile and an individual skew
might be fitted either by herding limits or by initial posi-
tion of the players community. The values of σ are closer
to each other in Table III than in the initial position.
This, together with SPX results and general reduction
of social influence-like phenomena with time, favors the
assumption of the herding limits solution for skew pat-
terns.
The smile of implied volatility corresponds to a high
value of the initial anti-herding between the market play-
ers, see 10.
C. SPX 09/15/05
The SPX index 09/15/05 possesses a smile type of im-
plied volatility for maturity times of 1 day and 1 month,
together with a skew type for later maturity times[20].
The results of parameter calibration are presented in Ta-
ble III C. The calibration of skew was done with initial
conditions (α0 = 0.5, β0 = 0.5) to favor the influence of
herding limits (see Fig. 9).
The fit of implied volatilities with 1 month and 15
month maturity times is presented in Fig. 11. The fit
of the smile mainly depends on the initial position of
the market players. The skew depends more on imposed
herding limits. A stronger limit can bring implied volatil-
12
Parameter 6 Month 1 Year
Iup 0.29 ± 0.06 0.21 ± 0.03
Ilow -0.11 ± 0.08 -0.11 ± 0.02
σ 1.28 ± 0.06 1.33 ± 0.05
kasym 0.91 ± 0.04 1.07 ± 0.03
∆market 7.6e-03 ± 5.1e-04 2.3e-03 ± 5.8e-04
TABLE IV: Fit with herding limit when initial conditions for
the population are around 0.5. The convergence is good. It is
ambiguous whether the main phenomenon is initial position
or herding limits.
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FIG. 10: The initial position of the population es-
timated separately for each maturity time of VOD
volatility surface. To demonstrate the change of the pa-
rameters with time the initial position with fit accuracy is
shown for all four times from table III together with the herd-
ing limits for 1 year maturity from IV. One can argue that
the population moves toward the center (α = β = 0.5) and
the affect of initial position is replaced by thr affect of herding
limits. The later maturity times may be fitted either with the
help of herding limits or, alternatively, with initial position
that is different from neural community (α = β = 0.5). The
resolution of this question requires additional analysis.
ity to almost flat Black-Scholes form.
The strong smile at 1 day maturity can be fitted (see
Fig. 12), though it requires extreme values of volatility
relative to other maturity times (see Table III C. The
initial position (α0, β0) indicates that the market players
anti-correlated with the market.
Following results III C, the initial position of the com-
munity converges to the region of small social influence
with maturity time (Fig. 13). It is clearly separated into
two groups of early and later maturity times.
Herding limits as a function of time according to Ta-
ble III C are shown in Fig. 14. The limits converge to 0
with time and bring the market players community closer
to the Black-Scholes limit. The lower absolute value of
Ilow than Iup at later maturity times indicates a positive
correlation between the market behavior and players pre-
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FIG. 11: Fit of smile and skew implied volatilities. The
fit of 1 month and 15 month implied volatilities of SPX index
09/15/05. For comparison, we added a calculated implied
volatility at Black-Scholes limit with Iup, Ilow = ±0.01. This
graph demonstrates three types of implied volatilities.
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FIG. 12: The fit of implied volatility surface with 1
day maturity time SPX index 09/15/05 Implied volatil-
ity is characterized by strong smile. The fit is valid only for
Strike/Spot ≈ 1 since for short maturity times, the probabil-
ities of the price distribution are close to initial δ function at
Strike/Spot = 1.
dictions.
Market players dynamics, following the results for SPX
indices and VOD stock, at early maturity times, may
possess a high value of social influence. This is reason-
able, since information about the current state of the
community is preserved for a short time into the future.
Longer maturity times are characterized by strong herd-
ing limits. The initial position of the population lacks
almost any social influence value. Indeed, no memory is
preserved for a long time and, consequently, the market
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Parameter 1 Day 1 Month 3 Month 6 Month 15 Month
Iup 1 1 0.47 ± 0.06 0.39 ± 0.04 0.28 ± 0.02
Ilow -1 -1 -0.20 ± 0.05 -0.15 ± 0.01 -0.11 ± 0.01
σ 24.0 ± 0.08 5.6 ± 0.01 1.54 ± 0.09 1.46 ± 0.04 1.45 ± 0.04
kasym 0.97 ± 0.039 0.62 ± 0.02 0.61 ± 0.08 0.80 ± 0.04 0.87 ± 0.03
α0 0.87 ± 0.030 0.94 ± 0.007 0.48 ± 0.018 0.47 ± 0.02 0.48 ± 0.05
β0 0.19 ± 0.033 0.16 ± 0.01 0.43 ± 0.04 0.46 ± 0.01 0.51 ± 0.02
B 0.005 ± 0.016 0.79 ± 0.052 1.19 ± 0.08 1.11 ± 0.02 1.09 ± 0.07
∆market -0.007 ± 0.036 0.40 ± 0.02 1.30 ± 0.07 1.33 ± 0.06 1.33 ± 0.07
TABLE V: Models parameters(mean value ± standard deviation) that fit implied volatility surface of SPX index from 09/15/05.
The fit was done without herding limits for early times and with herding limits for the later ones. The value of the prime was
= 0.065 at that time. Parameter B ≈ 1 for later times, though, is different from the initial ones. The initial position (α0, β0)
is drastically different from 0.5. This case can be considered as a mix of the previous ones.
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FIG. 13: The initial position of population as a func-
tion of maturity time for SPX index of 09/15/05. The
calibrated initial positions (see Table III C) of market players
community (α0, β0) are presented as ellipses in (α, β) space.
The center of the ellipse corresponds to the mean value while
its axes are standard deviations of calibration over numerous
runs. Early maturity times require a high value of initial so-
cial influence or deviation from the Black-Scholes limit α ≈ β,
see Figure 5. The results for later time assume almost no ini-
tial social influence in the community.
envisioned by its players converges to the Black-Scholes
limit with maturity time.
IV. DISCUSSION
To corroborate the basic assumptions of the model, let
us compare the implied volatility surfaces of the SPX
index, the VOD stock, and the results of this work. The
model, after appropriate calibration of its parameters,
successfully fits real implied volatility surfaces of both
smile and skew types. The models parameters describe
the community of the market players together with the
market that transforms the players action into observable
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FIG. 14: The limits Iup and Ilow as the functions of
maturity time for SPX index from 09/15/05. The Iup
and Ilow limit possible correlation and anti-correlation of the
players with the market. The limits were calibrated separately
for each maturity time (see TableIII C). Implied volatilities
for short maturity times of 1 day and 1 month possess strong
smile form. The fit of these volatilities requires lack of the
herding limits (Iup > 1, Ilow < −1). For later times herding
boundaries gradually reduce to the direction of the Black-
Scholes limit. The allowed region between two limits is shifted
toward a positive correlation between market players opinions
and market players dynamics.
prices. The obtained description of the market, together
with players community, is analyzed in light of the model
assumptions and common sense.
The assumption of the Black-Scholes (log normal) price
dynamics in the case of random (zero social influence)
acts of the market players is supported both by proper-
ties of real implied volatility surfaces and the results of
this work. The properties of market players for the pur-
pose of evaluation options with greater maturity times
are less correlated with their current values. Indeed, im-
plied volatilities converge to the Black-Scholes flat form
with maturity time. The same happens for calibrated
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herding limits that converge to their Black-Scholes limit
Iup ≈ Ilow ≈ 0 with maturity time (see Figure 14).
The assumptions of market mechanism in the form of
deterministic function (without a stochastic term) are
supported by the ability to fit real implied volatility sur-
faces. Each parameter of the model is justified and essen-
tial. Moreover, the model requires an additional heuris-
tic parameter ∆market to match reality. This parame-
ter, however, is justified as market’s reduction of market
players volatility by regulations for stability and crisis
prevention.
The distinctive explanations for skew and smile phe-
nomena as limits and initial values of herding, respec-
tively, agree with previous association of skew and smile
implied volatility surfaces with indices and stocks. The
index is an average price of multiple stocks and, there-
fore, better presents the average properties of the market.
Consequently, in the case of indices, the limits on herding
should be stronger and the dependence on initial value of
herding is low. Contrary, individual stock might possess
broader limits on herding and its value for short maturity
times.
Upper Iup and lower Ilow limits on herding correspond
to the maximum of the correlation and anti-correlation
of market players opinions, respectively. The greater Iup
the greater the possibility of collective phenomena of the
players.
The definition of market player strategies using condi-
tional probabilities stems from similar techniques of the
game theory[31]. The question of optimal strategy and
its evolutionary stability remains under discussion[32].
An analysis of the market may contribute to this dis-
cussion due to the huge amount of available data.
On the other hand, there is also an interesting dis-
cussion whether evolution is relevant for the market
players[33][34][35][36][37][38][39].
The models limitations and drawbacks are the follow-
ing: the transaction costs and other players states but
bull or bear were not taken into account; equal finan-
cial weight of the players was assumed; and the prime
interest rate was omitted in the voting process of the
market players and considered only as monetary value
change during calculating implied volatility. The prime
converges close to its real value, however, if assumed to
be a free parameter. In addition, we did not take into
account near neighbors topological constraint. A single
market player may affect any other player with a limit
on the total amount of social influence it generates. The
excessive communication abilities of the present time and
a good match of the model results with real prices justify
this approach.
This work predicts the stochastic process for price dy-
namics that depends on a small number of well-justified
parameters. It is an advantage over approaches of local[6]
and stochastic volatilities[21]. The latter together with
completely heuristic descriptions of implied volatility
may be advantageous for practical needs by their speed.
Our model, however, can be accelerated by further mas-
sive parallelization and, in general, is comparable to any
Monte-Carlo based trading tools.
The results of this work are potentially relevant for
any agent-based simulation[19][40][41][42][43][44][45][13]
because the models major assumptions are independent
of the market microstructure. Moreover, the model is
impervious to modifications. The need for a function
that transforms the voting process to log normal requires
the terms µ and σ to depend on each other and prevents
their arbitrary modifications. Moreover, neglecting (10)
and writing the process in the form dγ ∝ (1 − 2γ)dt +
2
√
γ(1− γ)dz leads to unrealistic bounded expression for
the pricevote relation F ∝ arcsin(2γ− 1) instead of (13).
The results of this work support the relation of in-
formation technologies (IT) contribution to the financial
crisis of 1987. The implied volatilities of the SPX index
acquired significant skew during this crisis[7]. According
to our model, it indicates the growth of possible social in-
fluence of the market players. The latter might be a con-
sequence of extensive IT technology modification of the
markets and trading at that time. It corroborates that
information-like phenomena are the cause rather than the
consequence of the crisis.
The herding of the market players might be a new trad-
able parameter, similar to the volatility index (VIX)[46],
which describes the past values of market’s volatility.
On the contrary, in this work, herding describes possi-
ble future developments of the market players commu-
nity. It may be an important market indicator for cri-
sis analysis[47]. Moreover, herding can be estimated by
other means from internet responses and artificial market
experiments for comparison with the market, or even for
predicting the market behavior.
V. CONCLUSION
We presented a framework for modeling the market
prices dynamics based on opinion dynamics and herding
in the trading community. This framework uses the social
influence and mutual information between the players as
a quantitative measure of the herding effect and corre-
sponding deviation of the prices from the Black-Scholes
model. The derived relation between opinion dynamics
and price formation is general and argued to be indepen-
dent of exact market mechanism. The calculated option
prices fit real market data and can be useful for trading
and hedging. In addition, the estimated herding from
market data can be compared with herding from other
sources such as artificial markets, news, or social net-
works.
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